Introduction
Consider the case of automated reasoning under uncertainty in which we wish to take into account the uncertainty in a quantitative way. The Bayesian approach emerges as a popular one, due not only to the fact that probability theory has a firm mathematical foundation, but also to the non-monotonicity of the conditioning operator in probability theory. Generalizations of logic to cope with uncertain information have led to the investigation of the connection between logic and probability (e.g. Hailperin, 1984 , also Nilsson, 1986 ). At a more fundamental level, a logic of implicative propositions, compatible with conditional probability assignments, needs to be established in order to explain conditional reasoning. Such a logic is given in Adams' book (1975) . However, in Adams' work, basic objects, namely implicative propositions or conditionals, are taken as primitive in our natural language; syntatic logical operations among conditionals are defined in an ad-hoc manner (simply as one of many possible ways of extending those in Boolean logic) ; and the basic component for reasoning, namely the logical entailment relation, is defined semantically only for plausible reasoning (i.e. with defaults) . Note that, in 1968, Schay published a paper on a mathematical algebra of conditional events! In this paper, we will use our recent works (Goodman and Nguyen, 1988; Goodman, Nguyen and Walker, 1990) to supply a conditioning operator in logic, compatible with that in probability theory, and to show that it is possible to construct mathematically a conditional extension of the first-order logic in which a natural order relation among conditionals is non-monotonic relative to additional evidence. The problem of conditional probabilistic entailment is discussed, and some computational aspects are outlined.
Non-monotonic rules of inference
Each reasoning procedure in intelligent systems is essentially based upon a logical consequence (or logical entailment) relation in a given logic. In classical first-order logic, the entailment relation � is simply the order relation � in the Boolean ring R (of subsets of some set .Q, where � is subset inclusion relation, and, by Stone's representation theorem, R represents the collection of propositions in a natural language) . To keep things simple, the connectives "and", "or", and "not" are denoted by ·, V and ( ·) ', respectively. Also, for exposltlon purposes, It 1s convenient to view R as an algebraic ring with multiplication · , addition + (symmetric difference of sets), zero 0 (empty set) and unity 1 (Q). The partial order on R is: a, b e R, a :::; b if and only if ab = a. This :::; in first order logic is obviously monotonic: if a :::; b then 'Vc e R, we have ac :::; b. More specifically, for A c:: R, and Th(A) = {x e R: A::? x}, we say that ::? is monotonic if A C:: B c:: R implies Th(A) c:: Th(B).
The rule ::? is non-monotonic if it is not monotonic. By abuse of language, a reasoning procedure is said to be monotonic or non-monotonic according to whether ::? is monotonic or not. The terms "inference", "reasoning" and "logic", as in probabilistic inference, probabilistic reasoning, and probabilistic logic, should be understood with care! For example, while probability logic is monotonic, the probabilistic reasoning is claimed to capture a non-monotonicity property! It turns out that it all depends on the structure of the syntax of the logic used. To make things precise, by conditional inference (or reasoning), we mean E ::? a K (a follows logically from E in the context of K), where T = <K, E> is a theory (Pearl, 1988) , K is the knowledge base and E is the evidence. In this framework, ::? acts like a set-valued function with two arguments (K, E).
The non-monotonicity of ::? is in general relative to E, i.e. to the addition of facts or evidence.
This explains why conditional probability operator is referred to as being non-monotonic: For fixed a e R, the set-function P(a I · ) is not monotonic with respect to :::; on R. For non-monotonic reasoning, we refer the reader to McDermott and Doyle (1980) , Reiter (1980 ), McCarthy (1980 , Bibel (1986) , Geneserth and Nilsson (1987), Pearl (1988) .
To bridge the gap between logic and probability, it is necessary to define a conditioning operator in logic, or in Pearl's words "a new interpretation of if-then statements, one that does not destroy the context sensitivity of probabilistic conditionalization" (Pearl, 1988, p. 25) . This is consistent with Pearl's words (again) "probabilists should be challenged by the new issues that emerge from the AI experiment" (Pearl, 1988, Preface) , or with Grosof "non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning requires us to employ principles for drawing conclusions which properly extend (i.e. go beyond) the axioms of classical probability" (Grosof, 1988 ). This will be achieved in the next section. Note that this situation is analogous to that of quantum probability (e.g. Gudder, 1988) : although quantum mechanics is essentially a probabilistic theory, Kolmogorov's probability model is inappropriate.
3. The mathematical conditional extension of logic.
Statements of the form "most b's are a's", "usually, birds fly", "if b then a", etc., are referred to as conditionals or implicative statements, and are symbolized as (a I b) to distinguish them from material implication forms b -1 a = b' V a. As in Adams (1975) , the basic requirement is that probabilities of conditionals are The logical operations on RIR turn out to be
For inference purposes, the extended order relation to RIR is useful. Define It can be shown that if (a I b) ::;; (c I d) , then , for any probability measure P, we have P(alb)::;; P(cld) . Now the conditioning operator ( · I · ·) is non-monotonic relative to the second argument. Indeed, for a, b, c e R, we have in general ab::;; abc and a'b::;; a'bc, so that (a I b) and (a I be) are not comparable. This fact also explains the non-monotonicity of the conditioning probability operator. See also Dubois and Prade (1988, 198 9) .
4.
Reasoning with and computational aspects of conditional logic.
In the reasoning framework T = <K, E> , as in Pearl (1988) , where K c R/R and E s R, conditionals of interest are of the form (a I E) , for a e R, and in this notation, E stands for the con j unction of all events in E. When K is fiven together with conditional probabilities a .= P(c.ld.) , i = 1, 2 , ... , n , say , where (c. d.) e K, the value of P(aiE)
represents a degree of logical enta i lment. See also Goodman, Nguyen and Walker (19 90 ) .
We will discuss here only a formal computational procedure for P(a I E) . It is simply a generalization of Hailperson (1984) , see also Nilsson (1986) . Now observe that P(alb) = P(ab) + P(alb)P(b'). Hence the problem of computation of, say , P(a n + llb n + l) ' given P(a i lb i ) ' i = 1 , 2 , ... , n, can be described as follows. From the collection of 2 (n + 1 ) events {a 1 , b 1 ; a 2 , b 2 ; ··· ; a n + 1 ' b n + 1 } '
consisting of all events of the form a 1 /3 1 a2 /32 a n + 1 f3 n + 1 a 1 b 1 a 2 b 2 .. . a n + 1 b n + 1 , where a j , f3 j e {0 , 1} , with rn be size of .9': rn � 2 2(n+1) , and label these elements as c l ' c 2 , ... , e m . In view of (*) Of course, as in the case of unconditional probabilities, the solutions for the A j 's is not unique in general, and bounds for P(a n+1 lb n+1 ) can be obtained using linear programming technique. For practical computational purposes, stochastic optimization might be helpful.
